Drone Attacks in Iraq: Who Is Behind Them And Why?
| In recent weeks, Iraq has witnessed a series of drone attacks targeting sensitive military sites, airports and oil installations, with the perpetrators still unidentified. These attacks have raised questions about their timing – coinciding with the ceasefire between Israel and Iran – and the identity of those responsible. Iraq Studies Unit|29 Jul 2025 |
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Risky Maneuvers: Iraq’s PMF Law Between Internal Disputes and External Pressures
| Iraq Studies Unit|3 Jun 2025 Amid the ongoing geopolitical shifts in the Middle East since October 7, 2023, the Iraqi government’s proposed law on the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), introduced on March 12, 2025, reflects growing concerns by Iran’s proxies in Iraq about the rapid decline of Tehran’s regional influence. The proposed law represents an attempt to reposition Shia militias inside Iraq by reconstituting them within a new legal and institutional framework. This move allows these militias to consolidate their influence by integrating them in the structure of the Iraqi state, thus making it more difficult to target them militarily and financially without destabilizing Iraq and the broader region. The Iraqi Parliament completed the first reading of the resolution on March 24, 2025. However, the government has withdrawn the draft bill due to internal disputes and direct US pressure. The motives behind the draft law, the circumstances surrounding its withdrawal and the potential for endorsing it depend on the balance of power within the Iraqi parliament, the readiness of the Shia political actors and the extent of pressure exerted by both Tehran and Washington on Baghdad. These factors, unfolding during a period of regional realignment, will be the focus of this paper. Introducing and Withdrawing the PMF Law Until recently, the issue of formalizing the PMF within the Iraqi legislative system was not a priority issue for Shia forces, which had never previously made any such effort. Rather, their real focus was on passing a draft bill related to the “PMF Service and Retirement Law,” which had advanced through the whole legislative process and had been agreed upon by relevant parties in coordination with the PMF itself. However, a dispute erupted among the Coordination Framework (CF) factions over one of the bill’s fundamental provisions setting a retirement age of 60 for PMF members. The approval of this provision would have forced the retirement of thousands of PMF members, including 180 senior leaders in pro-Iran militias, notably PMF Chairman Faleh al-Fayyad, Chief of Staff Abdul Aziz al-Mohammadawi (aka Abu Fadak) and chief of security Abu Zainab al-Lami, as well as other influential figures affiliated with the Iraqi Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH). This controversy brought the draft law to a dead end. This dispute has coincided with a growing struggle over the PMF’s leadership. Several militias are seeking to replace al-Fayyad with their own members to assert control over the PMF’s financial resources and leverage its human and organizational power in the upcoming parliamentary election. With almost 270,000 fighters, PMF personnel are expected to play a pivotal role in influencing electoral outcomes. Observers anticipate a low voter turnout in Shia-majority strongholds, where the Sadrist Movement (SM) is campaigning for an election boycott. As a result, the government withdrew the draft legislation and replaced it with a more comprehensive one called the “PMF Law.” The proposed law conceals a strategic effort to consolidate political influence within the PMF and maximize political leverage in post-Sadr Iraq. Every vote will carry unprecedented weight in reshaping the balance of power in the next parliament. However, the government withdrew the bill once again due to internal opposition and direct US pressure. Key Takeaways The proposed law by the Iraqi government regarding the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) reflects growing concerns by Iran’s proxies in Iraq about Tehran’s diminishing regional influence. The proposed law represents an attempt to reposition Shia militias within Iraq by integrating them into a new legal and institutional framework. The proposed PMF law seeks to formalize and legitimize PMF’s military, security and administrative structure, which is controlled by the Iraqi Resistance Coordination Committee (IRCC), an umbrella organization comprising the most powerful pro-Iran militias. The introduction of this law at this sensitive time – given Iraq’s domestic situation and regional and international turmoil – is a risky move. It appears to challenge the stance of US President Donald Trump’s administration, which had called for dismantling the PMF’s forces and integrating them into security forces. There are two likely paths for the PMF law. The first is a full retraction followed by negotiations. The second, and most probable scenario, is to make some cosmetic revisions before resubmitting the draft to Parliament for approval. Transforming the PMF from a temporary force facing opposition even among Shia circles into a permanent institution embedded with the state and controlling key government institutions poses significant risks to Iraq’s Arab neighbors. These challenges call for a unified Arab response to the institutionalization of the PMF. Unclear Legal Framework for the PMF The PMF emerged under exceptional circumstances as an umbrella for pro-Iran Shia militias in Iraq. These militias had fought alongside Iraqi armed forces for years, even before ISIS took control of Mosul in June 2014. Similarly, the Sadrist Movement’s (SM) Saraya al-Salam and other militias were formed later through support by Shia parties and religious authorities. Their legitimacy was rooted in a fatwa (religious edict) by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani’s enabling pro-Iran militias to impose their political and ideological perspective over the new force and transform it into a parallel authority to the state. In February 2016, an executive order was issued by then-Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi to place the PMF under the authority of the Commander-in-Chief of Iraqi Armed Forces. However, tensions between the state and the PMF soon emerged as the latter started to expand its influence at the expense of the state. The Iraqi Parliament later endorsed the PMF Commission Law No. 40 of 2016, which consisted of just one article with four broad and brief sections. While this law aimed to recalibrate the relationship between the PMF and the state, it instead strengthened militia control over the PMF due to the absence of any mechanisms for oversight and accountability. In 2018, militias had formally entered into politics by taking part in the parliamentary election under the umbrella of al-Fatah Alliance (FA). This reopened debate over the PMF’s relationship with the state, prompting then-Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi to issue executive order no. 237 in July 2019. The decree stated: “All Popular Mobilization Forces are to operate as an indivisible part of the armed forces and be subject to the same regulations. Those who choose to integrate into the military must abandon their old names.” However, instead of implementing the decree, pro-Iran militias tightened their grip over the administrative, financial and operational structures of the PMF. They expanded the power of the PMF’s chief of security at the expense of the Ministry of Interior and the National Security Service, conducting raids and detaining civilians independently. The PMF escalated further when then-deputy chairman Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis announced the formation of PMF’s own air and naval forces without coordinating with the prime minister. The New Draft Bill The new draft bill includes several key provisions aiming to legitimize the PMF’s military, security and administrative structure. This framework is primarily controlled by what is known as the Iraqi Resistance Coordination Committee (IRCC), an umbrella organization for the most powerful pro-Iran militias, notably KH, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH), Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada Battalions (KSS), Badr Organization (BO), Harakat al-Nujabaa, Ansar Allah al-Awfiya (God’ Loyal Supporters) (AAA) and Kata’ib al-Imam Ali (KIA), also known as Imam Ali Brigades. Key provisions of this draft law include: The bill grants the PMF commission an independent legal status, allowing it to manage its administrative and financial affairs, procure military equipment and expand its mandate to include “protecting the democratic constitutional system.” Such a phrase is absent from laws governing other Iraqi military and security agencies. Given the PMF’s role in overturning the results of the 2021 parliamentary elections, this provision could serve as a legal authorization for the PMF to intervene in political processes under the guise of protecting „Shia rule“ and maintaining pro-Iran Shia forces in power, regardless of electoral outcomes. The PMF chairman is granted broad powers, the rank of a minister and a seat on the Ministerial Council for National Security (MCNS). The law also authorizes the chairman to direct PMF operations, issue instructions and directives and appoint officials within the organization’s formations without reference to the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces or other authorities. This contrasts with the law of the Counter-Terrorism Service (CTS) No. 31 of 2016 which recognizes the CTS an independent legal entity but requires it, in several instances, to obtain the approval of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces or the MCNS for any of its decisions or actions. The sweeping powers granted to the PMF chairman surpass those of the Minister of Defense and are further reinforced by the absence of any oversight mechanisms to ensure transparency in combat and intelligence operations, arms procurement or management of personnel, whose numbers have multiplied without scrutiny from other state institutions, such as the Ministry of Finance, the Election Commission, and the GHQ of the Armed Forces. The PMF refuses to share its database with government institutions, citing „concerns that it could fall into American and Israeli hands.“ The bill establishes a PMF military academy that grants graduates a bachelor’s degree in military sciences. This, however, further consolidates the fragmentation of Iraq’s military doctrine, especially that the law formally recognizes the Directorate of Doctrinal Guidance (DDG) – a unique formation in the armed forces used by militias to enhance the PMF’s ideological character. The draft law legitimizes PMF’s economic arm, represented by al-Muhandis General Company for Construction, Engineering and Mechanical, Agricultural and Industrial Contracting. This company functions as the Iraqi equivalent of Iran’s Khatam al-Anbiya Foundation, the economic arm of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The Iraqi company aims to harness the resources of the Iraqi state to secure unlimited and unmonitored financial resources to finance unofficial activities. |
